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Current Developments in the Law of
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Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
On January 19, 1981, the Governments of the United States of America
and the Islamic Republic of Iran established the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal to resolve, inter alia, disputes then outstanding between United
States nationals and the Government of Iran arising out of "expropriations
or other measures affecting property rights." I Since then the Tribunal has
issued approximately two dozen awards discussing a broad range of fac-
tual and legal issues surrounding such claims. Although a number of
expropriation cases remain to be decided, including several major ones, 2
the awards so far rendered permit a preliminary assessment of the major
features of expropriation law as currently articulated by the Tribunal.
This article briefly surveys these awards, analyzing them in three
broad areas: First, the types of conduct that engage state responsi-
bility under the rubric of expropriation; second, the standard of com-
*Member, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the invaluable contributions of Jeffrey A. Rob-
inson, a member of the District of Columbia Bar, to the preparation of this article.
I. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), art.
II(1), 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 9 (1981-82), 20 I.L.M. 231 (1981).
2. More than half a dozen cases involving alleged expropriation are under consideration
following hearings and pending issuance of final awards. Given the requirements of arbitral
secrecy embodied in article 31, note 2, of the Tribunal Rules and inherent in the very nature
of arbitration, those cases, as well as the other expropriation cases pending before the
Tribunal, are excluded from any consideration in this article. None of the conclusions of
the present article may be taken as indicative of the manner in which any of the cases still
pending before the Tribunal will or may be decided.
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pensation that must be awarded to the owner of expropriated prop-
erty; and third, the various valuation methods used to quantify
damages. This analysis is prefaced by a general explanation of the
legal framework of the Tribunal, as well as the common historical
facts out of which most of the expropriation claims arise, and is
followed by summary conclusions.
I. Background
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TRIBUNAL
The treaty documents on which the Tribunal is based, collectively
referred to as the Algiers Accords, 3 provide the guidelines by which
the Tribunal is to render its awards. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal
over disputes arising out of "expropriations or other measures af-
fecting property rights, ' 4 while not further defined, encompasses
claims for property nationalized by decree as well as property seized
de facto.5
For the Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an American expropriation
claim, it must be shown that the dispute was "outstanding" as of
January 19, 1981; that the claimant is a United States "national" (a
citizen of the United States or a corporation at least 50 percent owned
by U.S. citizens and formed under the laws of a United States juris-
diction); and that the respondent is "Iran" (the Government of Iran,
including any agency, political subdivision, instrumentality, or con-
trolled entity thereof).6
The Tribunal is required to decide all cases "on the basis of respect
for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial
and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking
into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances." 7
3. See Claims Settlement Declaration, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3 (1981-82), 20 I.L.M. 223
(1981). These include (in addition to the Claims Settlement Declaration): the Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, id. at 5, 20 I.L.M. at
224; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, id. at 7, 20 I.L.M. at 229; and the Escrow
Agreement, id. at 12, 20 I.L.M. at 234.
4. See supra note I.
5. See, e.g., Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran Award No. 93-2-3 at 9 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 96, 101-02 (1983).
6. See Claims Settlement Declaration, art. VII, supra note 1, at 11-12, 20 I.L.M. at 232-
33.
7. Art. V, id. at 11, 20 I.L.M. at 232.
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B. THE COMMON HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN
As all of the decisions discussed below arose during or shortly after
the Islamic Revolution that ushered in the current Government of Iran,
comparison and analysis of such decisions are facilitated by a review of
the common fact patterns underlying the cases. 8 These may be divided
into two categories: (1) property lost during the height of the civil tur-
bulence occurring from November 1978 into February 1979; and
(2) property over which the Islamic Government assumed control or own-
ership after that time.
The Islamic Revolution was characterized by strong anti-American and
anti-Western rhetoric commencing in earnest during 1978 and growing
towards the end of that year. This was increasingly accompanied by mass
demonstrations, political disturbances, and civil unrest, including strikes
and riots. Many American individuals and companies reported receiving
anonymous threats; some were subjected to acts of violence. Key indus-
tries, including oil production and processing, and banking, were period-
ically disrupted by strikes, making it difficult for U.S. companies to
operate normally and to carry out routine business transactions. These
conditions, and their legal ramifications, have been described in Tribunal
awards. 9
As a consequence, many American businesses evacuated the depen-
dents of their expatriate employees, hoping that conditions would im-
prove shortly. When the situation continued to deteriorate, the bulk of
American businesses withdrew all or most of their staff between late
December 1978 and January 1979. By February 10 only a few American
businesses remained operating in Iran, generally with skeleton staffs.
Some of these companies' last representatives have testified that they
8. It is not possible in the scope of this article to set out, even briefly, the full course of
the Islamic Revolution. For one interesting account see B. RUBIN, PAVED WITH GOOD
INTENTIONS-THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND IRAN (1981).
9. "[Bly December 1978, strikes, riots and other civil strife in the course of the Islamic
Revolution had created classic force majeure conditions at least in Iran's major cities. By
'force majeure' we mean social and economic forces beyond the power of the state to control
through the exercise of due diligence." The situation created in Iran at least during the time
from December 1978 until 15 Feb., 1979 by civil unrest, strikes, riots and a state of general
upheaval was such that both the Claimant and the governmental authorities and agencies
in this case were not able to perform certain of the contractual obligations that they had
previously undertaken.
The Tribunal finds that revolutionary conditions, including a general disruption of banking
operations, existed on 15 Feb. 1979 and constituted force majeure. ...
Sylvania Technical Sys., Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 at 15 (June 27, 1985), quoting
Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of Nat'l Defense of Iran, Award No. ITL 24-49-2 at I I-
12 (July 27, 1983), 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 147, 152-53 (1983).
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were forced to depart at gunpoint, escorted out of the country by
Revolutionary Guards, bands of militia in the vanguard of enforcement
of the new policies. Those businesses leaving during this period gen-
erally attempted to organize or wind up their affairs as quickly and
effectively as possible, but, owing to the circumstances, were not al-
ways entirely successful.
After the turmoil had subsided somewhat, during March-June 1979,
many businesses made tentative contacts with the new Government in
attempts to return and resume work. 10 The new Government also con-
tacted others with invitations to return. Not all invitations were accepted.
Some companies took the position that force majeure conditions had
totally interrupted their contractual obligations. Others, particularly those
with subsidiary or affiliate operations, attempted to continue to manage
these entities through their local staff and directors by exercising their
shareholders' rights.
The new Government took several steps to bring the Iranian economy
more under its control. Banks were nationalized on June 7, 1979; in-
surance companies on June 25, 1979; and certain heavy industries start-
ing July 5, 1979.11 On January 8, 1980, the Revolutionary Council
adopted a Single Article Act calling for the nullification of oil contracts
inconsistent with the Government's policy of a totally nationalized oil
industry. 12
In addition to these formal steps of nationalization, the Government
implemented several other measures affecting the management of busi-
nesses in Iran. The Government encouraged the formation of formal work-
ers' councils to deal with management in assuring that employees' rights
were adequately respected. 13 U.S. managers and owners often considered
these groups as both hostile to their ownership interests and anxious to
pursue political objectives not consistent with the profitable operation of
the businesses.
As an additional step to consolidate the political and financial objectives
of the Revolution, the Government implemented various laws for the re-
placement of business management under a variety of circumstances. Pur-
suant to this authority, many of the remaining U.S. companies operating in
Iran were notified that their designated managers had been "provision-
10. See, e.g., Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 255-48-3 (Sept. 19, 1986).
11. INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 at 8 (Aug. 13, 1985).
12. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., Iran v. Iran, Award No. ITL 11-39-2 (Dec. 30, 1982),
1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 487 (1981-82).
13. See generally Schering Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 122-38-3 at 15-18 (April 16, 1984),
5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361, 368-71 (1984).
VOL. 21, NO. 3
LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION 643
ally" replaced with managers or directors appointed by the Government.
Some U.S. companies protested;14 others appeared to acquiesce.15
Most direct or indirect U.S. business contacts remaining in Iran through
the summer of 1979 were brought to an abrupt end in November 1979
with the seizure of American diplomatic personnel and citizens at the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran. When the successful negotiations and imple-
mentation of the Algiers Accords secured their release, many U.S. com-
panies filed claims with the Tribunal.
II. Actions Engaging State Responsibility for Expropriation
For a company alleging expropriation of its property two of the most
significant issues are whether the State is liable for the conduct said to
constitute expropriation, and, if so, the date at which the expropriation
occurred. The former is a necessary element to a successful claim; the
latter may have a great impact on the valuation of the dispossessed property.
A. DETERMINING WHETHER AN EXPROPRIATION HAS OCCURRED
The Tribunal has had no difficulty in recognizing the expropriatory
effect of Iranian public laws expressly nationalizing industries or particular
entities. Thus, for example, in American International Group, Inc. v.
Iran16 and INA Corp. v. Iran17 the claimants were able to recover damages
for their shares of Iranian insurance corporations nationalized pursuant
to a "Law of Nationalization of Insurance and Credit Enterprises." 1
8 It
was undisputed that this law constituted a taking of property for which
the Iranian Government was responsible.
Most cases brought before the Tribunal, however, involve the gray area
of expropriation in which no formal taking is announced by the host
government, but the alien argues that the property has been seized de
facto. In deciding these cases the Tribunal has consistently ruled that
interference by the Government with the alien's enjoyment of the inci-
dents of ownership-such as the use or control of the property, or the
income and economic benefits derived therefrom-constitutes a com-
pensable taking. The Tribunal's decisions vary slightly in their discussion
14. See, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 55-129-3 at 31-33
(Oct. 28, 1985).
15. See, e.g., Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 at
8-12 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 224-26 (1984).
16. Award No. 93-2-3 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96 (1983).
17. Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985).
18. Id. at 4.
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of the degree of interference necessary to a finding of expropriation, but
the most common benchmark appears to be reasonableness. In one of its
earliest cases the Tribunal suggested in dictum that an unreasonable in-
terference is sufficient to find expropriation. 19 This standard was followed
shortly thereafter in Golpira v. Iran,20 and more recently in International
Technical Products Corp. v. Iran.21 Other awards describe the standard
as requiring an "interfere [nce] ... to such an extent that these [property]
rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated" '22 or state that a taking occurs whenever an owner is "de-
prived of fundamental rights of ownership" and "the deprivation is not
merely ephemeral." 23 While these last two groups of cases could be in-
terpreted as somewhat divergent-the one requiring that the arguably
more difficult standard of uselessness be proved, the other that of a non-
ephemeral loss of fundamental rights-both tend to rely on the others for
general support. 24 Similarly, in still other cases, the Tribunal examines
whether the effective use of the property has been lost.25 The decisions
of the Tribunal, therefore, have not focused on semantics, but rather on
the reality of the impact of the alleged expropriation. Consequently, the
standard both explicitly and implicitly adopted by the Tribunal requires
an unreasonable interference with property rights caused by actions at-
tributable to the Government.
What constitutes "unreasonable interference" may vary under different
circumstances. The parameters of a linkage to the Government sufficient
to support attribution of a taking to it also may vary. The first of these
two key issues is discussed below in connection with the three major
types of property for which expropriation claims have been lodged with
the Tribunal: (1) personal property, such as office equipment or household
19. Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, Award No. 19-98-2 at 9 (Dec. 30, 1982), 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.
499, 504 (1981-82).
20. Award No. 32-211-2 at 10 (Mar. 29, 1983), 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 171, 177 (1983).
21. Award No. 196-302-3 at 46 (Oct. 28, 1985).
22. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 at 51 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 122, 154 (1983); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 220-37/231-1 at 22,
28 (Apr. I1, 1986).
23. Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 at 10, 11 (June
29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225 (1984); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No.
217-99-2 at 14 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 626 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 at 10 (Aug. 8, 1986) (citing, inter alia,
Foremost, Starrett, Tippetts, and Phelps Dodge for the "well-settled" principle that property
may be taken "through interference by a State in the use of that property or with the
enjoyment of its benefits"); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 14 (Mar.
19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 626 (1986) (citing both Starrett and Tippetts).
25. See Gianoplus v. Iran, Award No. 237-314-1 at 7 (June 20, 1986); see also Starrett
Housing Corp. v. Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 at 54 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.
123, 156 (1983).
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effects; (2) funds held in bank accounts; and (3) entire businesses or major
operating assets. Thereafter follows a discussion of the second issue,
attributability to the respondent Government.
1. Unreasonable Interference
a. Tangible Property
The cases decided to date involving expropriation of tangible property
by Iran have involved the physical seizure of these assets. When such
seizures are clearly attributable to the Government, 26 the Tribunal has
not hesitated to find an expropriation.
Dames & Moore v. Iran27 is representative of this type of award. The
claimant charged that Government representatives physically occupied a
rented warehouse in which the claimant stored its office equipment, ve-
hicles, instruments, and tools; that they declared the warehouse was to
be converted to a public use (for emergency housing of war refugees);
and that they announced the claimant's private property stored therein
was to be turned over to the Iranian Army. The Tribunal regarded the
claimant's affidavits and allegations as sufficient proof of this occurrence,
especially since it was not denied by the Iranian Government.
The Tribunal held that the dislocation of ownership rights was complete
and constituted an unreasonable interference amounting to a taking even
in the absence of a formal decree. 28 The Tribunal also rejected the re-
spondent's alternative assertion that the custodian named by the claimant
to safeguard the property in its absence had previously transferred the
property to himself to satisfy certain unsubstantiated debts of a vague
origin. Consequently, the claimant was entitled to compensation for its
property.29
b. Bank Accounts
Many claimants were unable to withdraw or obtain access to their dollar
and rial funds held in their Iranian bank accounts at the time they departed
Iran. One of many theories of liability on which claimants have sought to
recover for such losses is expropriation. 30 In resolving these cases, the
26. See infra text section II.A.2.
27. Award No. 97-54-3 (Dec. 20, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 212 (1983).
28. Id. at 22, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 223.
29. The same result was also reached in Computer Sciences Corp. v. Iran, Award No.
221-65-1 (Apr. 16, 1986); William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran, Award No. 116-1-3 (Mar.
19, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198 (1984).
30. Other related theories, beyond the scope of this article, include breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, breach of applicable treaties (such as the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S.
39, as amended, and the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between
the United States of America and Iran, see infra note 81), and violations of domestic Iranian
law.
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Tribunal appears to have applied the same basic standard of unreasonable
interference with the use or control of the property,31 but has demanded
a showing of a high degree of interference before an expropriation is
considered to have occurred.
American Bell International Inc. v. Iran32 is the only case to date in
which the Tribunal has clearly found a taking of a bank account. The
claimant held funds in an Iranian bank account which could be disbursed
only upon the joint signatures of claimant's designated agent and the
representative of an Iranian governmental entity with which the claimant
had been doing business prior to the Revolution. The claimant had been
using the account to wind up its affairs after its departure during the
Revolution. Once these obligations were concluded, the claimant made
several written requests to the joint account party for the release of the
funds. These requests were denied. Instead, an agent of the Iranian gov-
ernmental entity demanded that the claimant's agent accede to its order
transferring the funds into an account under the sole control of the Iranian
Government. The agent of the Government threatened that noncompli-
ance "would have serious personal consequences," and would, in any
case, "not stop" the Government from obtaining access to the funds.
Under these circumstances, the Tribunal had no trouble concluding that
the funds had been taken: "Where, as here, both the purpose and effect
of the acts are totally to deprive one of funds without one's voluntarily
given consent, the finding of a compensable taking or appropriation under
any applicable law-international or domestic-is inevitable, unless there
is clear justification for the seizure." 33 Since the respondent was unable
to provide any evidence of any lien or any otherjustification for continued
Government access to those funds, the Tribunal awarded the value of the
funds so taken.
When, however, the funds have not actually been transferred and remain
subject to the control of the owner, the Tribunal has been much more
reluctant to find that an expropriation has occurred. Mere proof that the
bank itself has been nationalized does not establish the expropriation of
the funds, since the nationalization of the bank affects only the ownership
of that bank but not the bank's account liabilities. 34
31. See Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, Award No. 19-98-2 at 9 (Dec. 30, 1982), 1 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 499, 504-06 (1981-82).
32. Award No. 255-48-3 (Sept. 19, 1986).
33. Id. at 65. The Tribunal did not state whether it regarded the taking as purely an
appropriation by the respondent state-owned commercial entity, or an expropriation directly
attributable to the Government, but appeared to regard the legal consequences as identical
under the circumstances of that case.
34. William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran, Award No. 116-1-3 at 42 (Mar. 19, 1984), 5
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198 (1984).
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Claimants in several cases have challenged exchange control restric-
tions as constituting a taking. The Tribunal has generally avoided taking
a stand on whether exchange control regulations constitute a taking by
focusing exclusively on the sufficiency of the demand for access to the
funds. Where claimant's demand was specific, and the bank does not
show it attempted to obtain approval to disburse the account funds under
applicable law, the Tribunal has found a basis for ordering payment of
the account funds. 35 When the demand is not sufficiently specific, how-
ever, no recovery has been permitted. 36 The Tribunal's reluctance to make
awards related to funds which are still nominally held in an account-
despite the futility of earlier attempts to retrieve the funds, the continuing
practical unavailability of the funds, and the inability of foreign companies
profitably now to use the funds in Iran-has produced sharp dissents. 37
c. Businesses
Probably the largest category of de facto expropriation cases involves
the loss of a business entity or commercial operation in Iran. In applying
the standard of unreasonable interference with such interests the Tribunal
generally has used a broad approach, focusing on the entire panoply of
ownership rights, including the right to appoint directors and participate
in management (to the extent of the owner's pro rata share in the entity);
the receipt in the ordinary course of business of financial and commercial
information from the business; receipt of income or other distributions;
and other aspects of ownership. None of these factors alone is necessarily
controlling.
The Tribunal's decisions have never fixed on a mechanical standard for
determining when an expropriation has occurred, and it would be a mis-
take to attempt to characterize them in this fashion. Nevertheless, one
recurrent factual pattern stands out in the cases in which an expropriation
has been found to date: The replacement of the owner's management or
directors with representatives appointed by the Government generally has
35. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 221-65-1 at 39-42 (Apr. 16, 1986).
36. Training Sys. Corp. v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 283-448-1, paras. 25-27 (Dec. 19,
1986) and Dissenting Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann with Respect to Bank Account
Claim (Dec. 19, 1986); McHarg v. Iran, Award No. 282-10853/10854/10855/10856-1, para. 56
(Dec. 17, 1986) and Separate Opinion of Judge Holtzmann, Dissenting in Part and Concurring
in Part, at 5 (Dec. 18, 1986); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 221-65-1 at 42-
43 (Apr. 16, 1986); Blount Bros. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 216-53-1 at 8-9 (Mar. 6, 1986);
Hood Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 142-100-3 (July 16, 1984); Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, Award
No. 19-98-2 (Dec. 30, 1982), I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 499 (1981-82).
37. See, e.g., Training Sys. Corp. v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 283-448-1 (Dec. 19, 1986)
(H. Holtzmann dissenting with respect to bank account claim); dissenting opinions of
Richard M. Mosk in Blount Bros. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 216-53-1 (Mar. 6, 1986); Hood
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 142-100-3 (July 16, 1984); Schering Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 122-
38-3 (Apr. 16, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361, 374 (1984).
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been a dispositive factor, resulting in a holding of expropriation as of the
point when the former managers or directors are no longer able to par-
ticipate in the management. 38 The Tribunal has consistently found a tak-
ing, even if the appointed managers purportedly were only temporary, as
long as the facts show the managers have assumed a functionally per-
manent role. Thus, for example, when the owner has been cut off from
ordinary dissemination of financial information and income distributions,
the expropriation is considered confirmed. 39
Other facts may also confirm the permanency of supposedly temporary
managers. In Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran40 the Tribunal held, for a
number of reasons, that the appointment of Government managers to take
over a massive housing construction project previously managed by the
claimant was the point at which an expropriation effectively occurred,
38. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 at 51-52 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 122, 155 (1983); Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award
No. 141-7-2 at 8-12 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 224-26 (1984); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 11-13 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 624-
25 (1986); Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 (Aug. 8, 1986); SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian
Oil Co., Award No. ITL 55-129-3 (Oct. 28, 1986).
39. See, e.g., Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2
(June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219 (1984). The claimant was a partnership which had
participated in a 50-50 joint venture. It asserted a claim for the value of its 50 percent
interest, allegedly expropriated by the Government of Iran. It presented proof that the
Iranian Government appointed a temporary manager who subsequently assumed the right
to sign checks issued by the joint venture as well as to make personnel and other decisions,
all without consulting the claimant. Subsequent to the appointment of the manager the
claimant was able to persuade the manager to accept joint signature procedures under which
the claimant's signature would also be required for issuance of checks, and thus the claimant
was able to continue participating to some extent in the management. However, after the
disruption in Iran-U. S. relations in November 1979, even this modest degree of participation
in management was denied to the claimant. The claimant established that after November
1979 the joint venture did not communicate with it; provided no reports on the status of
the project for which the joint venture had been created; and gave no answer to the claimant's
repeated telexes and inquiries. The Tribunal stated:
While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government...
such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived
of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely
ephemeral.
Id. at 10-11, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 225. Applying the standard, the Tribunal held that the
expropriation had not occurred merely by the appointment of a manager, since the claimant
was able to continue its management and enjoyed certain incidents of ownership through
continued cooperation with the government-appointed manager. However, the Tribunal
found that expropriation was complete when that cooperation ceased and all contact with
the management was terminated. It noted that the subsequent complete cutoff of any com-
munication between the joint venture and the claimant-a rupture confirmed by the passage
of time since the appointment of the manager and by the filing of the claim-confirmed the
expropriation. Consequently the Tribunal held that the claimant was entitled to recover for
its lost interest. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19, 1986),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986); Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 (Aug. 8, 1986).
40. Award No. ITL 32-24-1 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122 (1983).
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despite the Government's subsequent invitations-repeated up to the
hearing-for the claimant to return and finish the project. First, it was
clear that any return to the project would have been under substantially
different conditions than those to which the claimant originally had agreed.
The reduced or crippled right "freely to select management, supervisors,
and subcontractors" would have violated "an essential element of the
right to manage a project."' 41 Moreover, the Tribunal cited Iranian leg-
islation known as a "construction completion bill" for the proposition
that the Government contemplated that the ultimate right to manage such
housing projects rested with the Ministry of Housing and the Government-
owned bank designated in that bill. 42 Finally, the Tribunal concluded that
the expropriation was complete, since there was no evidence that the
claimant, if it returned to the project, would have been offered compen-
sation for any reduction in the value of its ownership rights and contract
rights caused by the managers appointed by the Government. 43
The scope of management functions is also a determinative factor. When
the Government-appointed managers have complete authority to run the
business, displacing the former management and precluding the owner
from selecting any representative, the Tribunal has unhesitatingly found
an expropriation. 44
Moreover, the governmental purpose in appointing the managers has
little or no bearing on whether the substitution of managers amounts to
an expropriation: "The intent of the Government is less important than
the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures
of control or interference is less important than the reality of their im-
pact." 45 Consequently, even when it is argued that the managers were
appointed to look after the best interests of the corporation, the Tribunal
has generally not held this to be a mitigating factor.
41. Id. at 52-53, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 155.
42. Id. at 53, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 155.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 55-129-3 at 40 (Oct.
28, 1985) (noting that the law authorizing appointment of the directors provided that the
government appointees would have " 'all the authorities necessary for managing the current
and routine affairs,' " while the former directors were " 'stripped of their competence'
and the shareholders were generally to have "no right 'to appoint [new] directors' . . .");
accord ITT Indus., Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2 (May 26, 1983) (G. Aldrich concurring),
2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 348, 350-51 (1983). See also Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Award No.
ITL 32-24-1 at 41 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122, 147 (1983), in which the Tribunal
noted that managers had "every necessary authority for running the day-to-day business
of the company," did "not require special permission from the original managers or owners,"
and thus were "in every sense the legal substitute for the original" managers.
45. Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 at II (June
29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225-26 (1984); see also Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-
355-3 at 12 (Aug. 8, 1986); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 14 (Mar. 19,
1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 626 (1986).
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The Tribunal underscored the irrelevance of the Government's moti-
vation for an expropriation in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran.46 In Phelps
Dodge the claimant corporation owned approximately 19 percent of a
corporation set up to construct and operate a plant for the manufacturing
of various industrial products. After the Revolution the Iranian Govern-
ment, acting through a "Council for the Protection of Industries," trans-
ferred management of the factory to two designated organizations, both
of which were agencies of the Government. 47 The factory, however, was
the principal operating asset of the company and the reason for which it
had been established. As a result of the transfer, no more meetings of the
board of directors or shareholders were held. The claimant received no
dividends. Similarly, the claimant received no information as to the op-
erations of the plant.
The Tribunal recognized that the legal authorization pursuant to which
the Government council had appointed new managers, a "Law of Pro-
tection of Industries and Prevention of Stoppage of Factories in the Coun-
try," described the managers as " 'trustees' and the administration of the
factory as 'provisional.' -48 The law nowhere stated, however, whether
the managers were trustees for the shareholders, and the nonpayment of
dividends and the complete exclusion of the claimant from information
as to the operation of the plant suggested that the managers were operating
as trustees for the Government. The Tribunal noted that it "fully un-
derst[ood] the reasons why the Respondent felt compelled to protect its
interests through this transfer of management and [also] ... underst[ood]
the financial, economic, and social concerns that inspired the law pursuant
to which it acted." 49
The Tribunal held nonetheless that "those reasons and concerns cannot
relieve the Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for
its loss. ' 5° Since the Government had taken control of the factory and
was running it for its own benefit, the Government was liable to the
claimant for the value of that property. 51
In cases in which no governmental managers have been appointed,
claimants have had more difficulty establishing an expropriation, espe-
cially when the claimant cannot establish that the absence of dividend
payments or financial information is due to direct governmental action.
46. Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986).
47. Id. at 12, 25 I.L.M. at 625.
48. Id. at 13, 25 I.L.M. at 625.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id., 25 I.L.M. at 626.
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Thus, for example, in Gianoplus v. Iran, when the claimant himself trans-
ferred his shares to an individual who was related to the founder of the
company and who was merely coincidentally also employed by the Gov-
ernment, the Tribunal found no expropriation occurred, especially since
claimant had continued to exercise some management in the company's
affairs thereafter and could not prove duress in the transfer.52
Tribunal precedent is far less developed on the question of whether an
unreasonable interference exists when the owner's rights to income are
cut off even while it continues to attempt to manage and direct the com-
pany to the extent of its pro rata representation on its board of directors.
In one recent decision the Tribunal has suggested that no expropriation
occurs when the owner attempts to continue management but is excluded
from the corporation's earnings.
In Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran5 3 the claimant alleged that its approx-
imately 31 percent interest in an Iranian corporation had been expropri-
ated due to: (1) the expulsion of its expatriate personnel from Iran during
the course of the Revolution; (2) the corporation's refusal from 1979 through
the day of the award to pay the claimant any dividends; (3) the forced
departure of the company's two representatives from the seven-person
board of directors in late 1981; and (4) interference with the provision to
the claimant of basic financial information about the corporation thereafter.
While admitting that the basic standard is that of undue interference,
the Tribunal concluded that in this particular case it was required to
evaluate whether the corporation's board had adopted measures "which
were not only detrimental in their effect on [the claimant] but which went
beyond the legitimate exercise by the majority of the shareholders of Pak
52. Award No. 237-314-1 at 7 (June 20, 1986). Similarly, in Golpira v. Iran, Award No.
32-211-1 (Mar. 29, 1983), 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 171 (1983), the Tribunal was confronted with
an alleged de facto expropriation of a shareholder interest in a corporation. The claimant
held twenty shares out of 2,500 total outstanding shares in the Borzooyeh Medical Group,
an Iranian entity. The claimant did not allege that the Government had appointed its own
managers or directors, but rather that (1) the Government's expropriation of the shares of
the family of the principal founder of the Iranian entity, (2) the fact that no dividends had
been paid, and (3) the fact 'that no financial information or responses to the claimant's
correspondence had been received, proved a de facto expropriation of the interests of all
shareholders, including those of the claimant. Id. at 7, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 173, 175-76.
The Tribunal, however, concluded otherwise. It held that no distributions had been di-
verted since the corporation had been unprofitable even prior to the alleged takeover. The
lack of financial information was attributable to the claimant's failure to consult locally
available sources of legal notice. No management rights were lost, since the claimant's
miniscule shareholdings did not entitle him to management representation. Id. at 8, 2 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. at 175-76. See also FMC Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 292-353-2, paras. 76-79
(Feb. 12, 1987).
53. Award No. 220-37/231-1 (Apr. 11, 1986).
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Dairy [the expropriated company] or by its duly elected board of directors,
of their right to manage the company's affairs in what they perceived to
be its best interests." 54
Applying this more elaborated standard, the Tribunal described the
evidence as being finely balanced. The Tribunal determined that the claim-
ant's continued attempts to participate in the management of the company
through its minority of two directors on the seven-person board of direc-
tors nullified its claims for expropriation. The fact that the board adopted
a policy, over the objections of these two directors, which expressly and
totally excluded the foreign shareholder from any participation in divi-
dends in 1979 and thereafter, was not sufficient to constitute an expro-
priation. Instead the Tribunal contended itself with awarding the amount
of the cash dividends that had not been paid as declared, up to the juris-
dictional cutoff point of January 19, 1981.55
2. Attributability to the Respondent Government
A principle confirmed by the Tribunal's decisions is that loss occurring
through revolutionary turmoil and violence is not ipso facto one that may
be recoverable against a successor government on an expropriation the-
ory; rather, a claimant must establish that such government intentionally
took action to assert control over the property.
The principal Tribunal case in this area is Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.
Iran.56 In Sea-Land the claimant operated a container transport service
loading and unloading containers at Bandar Abbas. The claimant alleged
that it had entered into a special agreement through the Port and Shipping
Organization (PSO) and ILB, an Iranian transportation company, by which
it was obligated to make substantial investments in the container handling
facility in exchange, inter alia, for PSO providing various facilitating
services, including expediting handling of the containerized items and
customs, health, and immigration clearance. The claimant alleged that,
commencing in September 1978, the PSO began to fail to provide pilots
and tugboats promptly for its ships and refused or neglected to arrange
for customs, health, and immigration clearances. The claimant also charged
that by February 1979 the PSO limited the types of commodities that
could be unloaded to medicine and foodstuffs. The claimant alleged fur-
ther that ILB ordered the dismissal of the entire non-Iranian workforce,
dictated the wages, terms, and conditions of employment of Iranians, and
subsequently prohibited any discipline or discharge of the Iranian work-
force. As a result Sea-Land was forced to suspend service temporarily
54. Id. at 28.
55. id. at 28-35.
56. Award No. 135-33-1 (June 22, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 149 (1984).
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in November 1978, recommencing at a reduced level from February 1979
until August 1, 1979. After August 1979 the claimant concluded there was
no prospect for reasonable resumption in the foreseeable future and ter-
minated the service completely. The claimant argued that it was entitled
to compensation for an expropriation effective as of the end of December
1978.
The Tribunal recognized that the claimant's ability to operate its busi-
ness had suffered substantial prejudice. However, it stressed that inter-
ference must have been attributable to the Government of Iran as part of
a deliberate policy to assert control over the claimant's property: "A
finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal
be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the
conduct of Sea-Land's operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-
Land of the use and benefit of its investment." 57
The Tribunal accepted the facts as alleged by the claimant and measured
them by this standard. It found that no intentional course of conduct had
been directed against Sea-Land by the Government: "A claim founded
substantially on omissions and inaction in a situation where the evidence
suggests a widespread and indiscriminate deterioration in management,
disrupting the functioning of the port of Bandar Abbas, can hardly justify
a finding of expropriation." 58
In at least two other cases, however, the Tribunal has determined that
the Government was responsible for actions of revolutionary organs taken
during the course of the Revolution. In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Iran59
the claimant alleged that representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary
Committee entered the premises of its business, ordered the departure of
all of its employees, and physically seized its assets stored therein. The
Tribunal held that under public international law the Government of Iran
was responsible for the confiscatory actions of the committee. Although
the Tribunal did not discuss the relationship of the committee to the
Government of Iran, it was accepted that this relationship was direct and
that the committee was a legitimate organ of the Government.
Similarly, in William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran6° the Tribunal
upheld a claim for expropriation of the contents of business offices by
Revolutionary Guards. In that case the copy of the notice of confiscation
issued by the Revolutionary Guards was sufficient to engage the State's
responsibility.61
57. Id. at 24, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 166 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 24, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 166.
59. Award No. 221-65-1 at 43-44 (Apr. 16, 1986).
60. Award No. 116-1-3 (Mar. 19, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198 (1984).
61. Id. at 42-43, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 226-27. However, in situations in which evidence
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The Tribunal has recognized that either de jure or de facto connections
between the Government and a nongovernmental entity could form a basis
for attributing the latter's acts to the Government. Thus, when possible,
the Tribunal examines the legal status of the purported agent of the Gov-
ernment, as well as any actual supervision by a governmental organ, to
determine whether or not an entity's actions can be attributable to the
Government. In Schering Corp. v. Iran,62 for example, the claimant sold
pharmaceuticals in Iran through a wholly owned subsidiary financed in
part by loans from other corporate subsidiaries. The claimant sought to
recover funds held in its bank accounts, as well as loan payments overdue
from its Iranian subsidiary, which payments the claimant alleged had been
blocked by a "Workers' Council" set up within the subsidiary and con-
sisting of its employees.
The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that the council was in
fact acting on behalf of the Government of Iran, or any of its agencies or
entities. Unlike so-called temporary managers, the Tribunal noted that
there was no evidence of any governmental interference or control over
the election of the various members of the council. Moreover, there was
no evidence of any orders, directives, or recommendations by the Gov-
ernment to the council, and no proof that it acted upon any instructions
of the Government. 63 The Tribunal also analyzed the constitutive legis-
lation under which the workers' council had been established. It found
that the workers' council was basically created to represent workers'
interests vis-A-vis the management and to cooperate with the management
to promote those interests. The Tribunal found that the formation of the
council on the basis of authorizing legislation by the State should not in
of the actual involvement by the purported organs of the Government has not been strong,
the Tribunal has found that alleged expropriatory actions are not attributable to the Gov-
ernment. In AFHI Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 234-179-2 (May 8, 1986), the
claimant, a corporation doing business in Iran, alleged that its offices had been taken over
by a revolutionary committee acting on behalf of the Government of Iran and that following
such occupation its assets in the office had been seized. The Tribunal denied this claim. It
found that the only evidence of actions on behalf of the Government was an affidavit of the
claimant's manager stating that he had received a phone call from the landlord, who, in
turn, said he had been told by an " 'unidentified representativ[e] of a revolutionary com-
mittee' "that the offices had been occupied and the contents seized. The Tribunal apparently
found this evidence too vague and therefore rejected it as "an inadequate basis upon which
to find responsibility" of the Government of Iran. Id. at 14.
A similar claim was denied in Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3 (Dec. 20, 1983),
4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 212 (1983), where the only evidence of the seizure of certain field
laboratories and other equipment was the claimant's assertion that it had obtained no further
access to the equipment after property in a warehouse had been expropriated by represen-
tatives of the Government.
62. Award No. 122-38-3 (Apr. 16, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361 (1984).
63. Id. at 16-17, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 379-80.
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and of itself mean that the council's function was part of the State ma-
chinery or that it acted as an agent of the Government. 64
In cases in which a taking is allegedly carried out by a private com-
mercial entity, the Tribunal appears to follow the same basic analysis
except, of course, the Tribunal assumes that in the ordinary case there
is no de jure link, since the separate juridical status of the corporation is
normally respected. Actions taken by such commercial entities that may
have an adverse impact on the economic affairs of those doing business
with the entities are not, by virtue of the governmental ownership of such
entities, thereby transformed into expropriations.
The most recent case to make this point is Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v.
Iran.6 5 The claimant alleged that the Government acquired ownership and
control of two private commercial corporations with which the claimant
had been doing business; it charged that the failure of the corporations
to honor their contracts with the claimant constituted an expropriation of
those contract rights by the Government. The Tribunal, however, held
that the mere assumption of ownership and control over the two corpo-
rations did not constitute expropriation of the rights associated with the
contracts entered into by those corporations. The Tribunal held that in
order to establish liability of the Government the claimant was required
to show direct governmental interference with the contracts, such as
"orders, directives, recommendations or instructions" issued to the cor-
porations by the governmental agency controlling the corporations. 66 While
the Tribunal provided no explanation or analysis of the source of this
reasoning, it appears to be analogous to the traditional piercing-the-veil
standard for disregarding corporate entities.
A similar standard of attributability was articulated in International
Technical Products Corp. v. Iran.67 In that case the claimant alleged that
a Government-owned bank, Bank Tejarat, unjustifiably took control of a
building owned by the claimant, and ultimately succeeded to title as the
legal owner to the building. The bank initially argued that it had acquired
the claimant's building through an authorized sale, then later claimed to
have succeeded to title through a formal mortgage foreclosure. The Tri-
bunal noted that to hold the Iranian Government responsible for the al-
leged taking would require one of two findings: (1) that the bank was
acting in its capacity as a state organ (rather than as a commercial entity);
or (2) that the Government or one of its organs was an accessory to the
transfer. The Tribunal held that the bank should be presumed to be acting
64. Id. at 15-17, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 379-80.
65. Award No. 259-36-1 (Oct. 13, 1986).
66. Id. at 20.
67. Award No. 196-302-3 (Oct. 28, 1985).
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in its private commercial capacity when acquiring real estate, an activity
within the scope of its ordinary operations. Thus, the Tribunal held that
even if the bank had acted unlawfully in acquiring the real estate, gov-
ernmental responsibility under international law for an expropriation would
not be established. 68
However, if a corporation acts through formal State organs to assume
permanent control over operating assets, the Tribunal is more willing to
find a sufficient link to the State. In Qilfield of Texas, Inc. v. Iran69 the
Iranian state-owned corporate respondent assumed effectively permanent
control over oil production equipment it had leased from the claimant-
invoking as justification an Iranian court order prohibiting respondent
from returning the equipment or paying rental fees. There, the Tribunal
found no evidence that the Iranian court ever notified the claimant or
permitted his intervention, and the Tribunal ruled that Iran was liable for
an expropriation. It specifically noted: "It is well established in interna-
tional law that the decision of a court in fact depriving an owner of the
use and benefit of his property may amount to an expropriation of such
property that is attributable to the state of that court." 70 The Tribunal's
analysis of several factors, including the actual deprivation of control,
the continuing and permanent nature of the deprivation, and the "im-
possibility" of the claimant's challenging the orders in Iranian courts,
persuaded it that the Government was responsible for the court order. 71
B. DATE OF THE TAKING
When an expropriation occurs in a revolutionary setting the fixing of
the exact date of the expropriation may be critical, since the property
value may fluctuate with the volatile political, social, and economic mi-
lieu. 72 For purposes of the Tribunal's jurisdiction the date of the taking
can be dispositive as well. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction over disputes
not outstanding on January 19, 1981; therefore, it cannot consider a claim
for an expropriation occurring after that date. 73
If an expropriation is effected by formal decree, the inquiry is relatively
simple: Ordinarily the date of the decree itself will be regarded as the
68. One arbitrator dissented on the grounds that the bank had not carried its burden to
show that the property was acquired lawfully. Id. (C. Brower dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
69. Award No. 258-43-1 (Oct. 8, 1986).
70. Id. para. 42.
71. Id. para. 43.
72. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 55-129-3 at 41 (Oct. 28,
1985).
73. See, e.g., Int'l Technical Prods. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 196-302-3 at 48-50 (Oct.
28, 1985).
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date of the expropriation, subject to any adjustments that need to be made
because of diminutions in value that may have been caused by earlier
announcement of the nationalization. 74
When there is no formal expropriatory decree but expropriation is in-
stead carried out by successive encroachments upon management and
ownership rights, the fixing of the date of expropriation is more difficult.
In the case of expropriation of assets such as bank accounts or office
equipment the Tribunal generally has selected the date as of which the
owners' access to the goods has been blocked. 75 If the taking is of an
ongoing business, through a chain of events, for example, beginning with
minor management interferences and culminating with the transfer of title,
the taking will not necessarily be found to have occurred at the time of
either the first or the last such event, but rather when the interference
becomes an "irreversible deprivation." In International Technical Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Iran the Tribunal stated:
A claim for a taking is outstanding on the day of the taking of property. Where
the alleged expropriation is carried out by way of a series of interferences in
the enjoyment of the property, the breach forming the cause of action is deemed
to take place on the day when the interference has ripened into more or less
irreversible deprivation of the property rather than on the beginning date of the
events. The point at which interference ripens into a taking depends on the
circumstances of the case and does not require that legal title has been
transferred .76
The question was further addressed in the context of the appointment
of provisional managers in SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co. 7 7 In
SEDCO the Tribunal was faced with two possible expropriation dates:
(1) August 2, 1980, when an order was issued causing the formal transfer
of claimant's shares; or (2) November 22, 1979, when claimant was stripped
of its management rights by the appointment of Government managers.
The Tribunal laid out a two-part standard, holding that a taking is pre-
sumptively found to occur upon the appointment of managers, and that
such presumption becomes conclusive if at the time of the appointment
there was no reasonable prospect of the return of control to the owner:
When, as in the instant case, the seizure of control by appointment of "tem-
porary" managers clearly ripens into an outright taking of title, the date of
appointment presumptively should be regarded as the date of taking....
74. See Am. Int'l Group v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 16-17, 21-22 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 106, 109 (1983); William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran, Award No.
116-1-3 at 43 (Mar. 19, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198, 226-27 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 255-48-3 at 66 (Sept. 19, 1986);
Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3 at 22 (Dec. 20, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.
212, 223, (1983).
76. Award No. 196-302-3 at 49 (Oct. 28, 1985) (footnote omitted; emphasis added); see
also Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 220-37/231-1 at 29 (Apr. 11, 1986).
77. Award No. ITL 55-129-3 (Oct. 28, 1985).
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When . . . it is also found that on the date of the Government appointment
of "temporary" managers there is no reasonable prospect of return of control,
a taking should conclusively be found to have occurred as of that date.
7 8
The Tribunal reasoned that the earlier date was more equitable because
the company's value to the claimant should not be affected by the Gov-
ernment's in fact operating the company and having sole control. over the
generation of income. The Tribunal also found this conclusion to be ap-
propriate in light of the principle of international law that valuation of an
expropriated entity must exclude the effect of expropriatory acts. 79
II!. Standard of Compensation
Determining the extent to which a claimant should be compensated for
the loss of a property interest is the second major area of controversy in
expropriation cases. These determinations necessarily involve an inquiry
into what type of remedy should be employed, as well as the scope of
that remedy.
A. RANGE OF REMEDIES
Theoretically a broad range of remedies is available to claimants whose
property interests have been expropriated. These include restitution or
specific performance, substitution of the value of the property taken,
award of punitive damages, or other measures that may arguably indem-
nify the claimant for the wrong done, or the property lost.
As a practical matter, however, virtually all of the Tribunal's decisions
focus solely on the return to the claimant of the value of the property
interest lost. Restitution or specific performance has not been discussed
or seriously contemplated in any of the Tribunal's awards. The reasons
for this are evident: The Tribunal does not have adequate enforcement
mechanisms for such restitution, but does have available to it the Security
Account established in the Algiers Accords out of which monetary awards
can be satisfied. Moreover, claimants have seldom, if ever, requested
punitive damages. 80
78. Id. at 41-42; see also Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 at 11-13 (Aug. 8, 1986),
which held that when a single manager was appointed on two separate dates to control two
related corporations, the date of taking was the earliest appointment date.
79. SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 55-129-3 at 41-42 (Oct. 28, 1985).
80. See generally SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-129-3 at 24-
26 nn. 34-35 (Mar. 27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 629, 648-49 nn. 24-26 (1986) (Brower,
J., separate opinion).
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B. DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OF COMPENSATION
The debate as to scope of compensation concerns whether the expro-
priating government must pay the full, genuine economic value of the
property or only partial compensation. This issue has been at the center
of a vortex of scholarly articles and speculation; some of the Tribunal's
decisions and awards on this point have received a degree of attention.
It is not possible to explain all the Tribunal's awards in this brief survey.
The major features and trends can, however, be identified. What emerges
is an overall picture of surprising continuity.
The principal issues confronting the Tribunal in expropriation cases are
(1) which law is applicable, Iran's domestic law, the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States of
America and Iran ("Treaty of Amity"), 8 1 or customary international law;
and (2) what is the precise content of that law.
Perhaps because of the large numbers of expropriation cases, and the
possibility of a high precedential impact of a case relying on-or reject-
ing-a particular standard of compensation, the Tribunal has tended to
discuss the issues sparingly, confronting them only when unavoidable.
That hesitancy has been aggravated by the vigor with which many of the
parties have disputed the substantive content of the Treaty of Amity and
customary international law.
In cases in which the amount of property in controversy was relatively
small, or the expropriation dispute was incidental to the main claims, it
is possible that the controversy over the applicable law and legal standard
may have outweighed the relative significance of the issue to the dispo-
sition of the case. Consequently, in many of the cases involving seizure
of tangible business assets, such as office equipment or furnishings, the
Tribunal has simply awarded the value of the property seized at the time
of seizure, upholding sub silentio the principle of full compensation for a
taking.8 2
81. Treaty of Amity, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 900, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
82. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3 at 23 (Dec. 20, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 212, 223-24 (1983) (awarding the approximate present worth at the time of
taking, as calculated downward from the original purchase price); William L. Pereira As-
socs., Iran v. Iran, Award No. 116-1-3 at 43 (Mar. 19, 1984), 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198, 226-
27 (1984) (awarding original purchase price less estimated depreciation); Computer Sciences
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 221-65-1 at 44 (Apr. 16, 1986) (net book value awarded as claimed);
Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 255-48-3 at 65-66 (Sept. 19, 1986) (awarding dollar
value of expropriated rials at time of taking). These awards are properly characterized as
granting full value even though they may be stated as based on the net book values, a
formula often advanced by those who argue only partial compensation is required. Since
they involve assets that were not income producing assets, or going concern enterprises,
the highest actual value would likely be their sale as at a liquidation, for which the depreciated
value would be the closest approximation.
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In cases in which the expropriated property forms the principal aspect
of the claim, the issues of applicable law and compensation standards
have been handled more directly.
The Tribunal's decisions to date have not upheld Iran's contentions
that its own domestic law governs the standards of compensation payable
for expropriated property. In the two cases dealing with expropriations
made under formal governmental decree, the Tribunal applied principles
of customary international law83 or treaty law84 to determine the standard
of compensation, without any reliance on Iranian law.
8 5
Application of the Treaty of Amity to cases at the Tribunal initially
carried some significant political overtones, with the United States (and
U.S. claimants) arguing in favor of its application and the Iranian parties
protesting that implementation of a treaty of "amity" was an insult and
affront given the polarized "enmity" between the two States. The Tri-
bunal's early decisions avoided what was seen as a controversial issue.
American International Group, Inc. v. Iran8 6 recognized the outstand-
ing dispute over whether the Treaty of Amity applied to an admitted
expropriation and solved the issue by finding that customary international
law required the repayment of the full value of the lost interest. The
Tribunal justified its refusal to rule on the applicability of the Treaty of
Amity by stating "[i]n view of the conclusions in this case, the Tribunal
need not here deal with the issues concerning the validity of the Treaty
of Amity and its relevance with regard to the present dispute."8 7 In a
concurring opinion Judge Mosk explained that he joined in the compro-
mise solution so that an award (for which a majority is required) could
be issued, but argued at length that the Tribunal should have held that
the Treaty of Amity also applied and required full compensation.
8 8
An award six months later also sidestepped the issue. Tippetts v. TAMS-
AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran89 held that full value was to be paid
under "international law and general principles of law," without opining
on the Treaty of Amity, which the parties had not briefed. Even as recently
as the initial interlocutory award in SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil
Co. the Tribunal was willing to hold that the Treaty of Amity incorporated
83. See Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 96 (1983).
84. See INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985).
85. Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 255-48-3 at 65 (Sept. 19, 1986) (finding of
compensable taking or an appropriation under any applicable law in inevitable unless there
is clear justification for a seizure).
86. Award No. 93-2-3 at 14, 22 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 105, 109 (1983).
87. Id. at 22, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 109.
88. See R. Mosk, concurring opinion at 1, 2.
89. Award No. 141-7-2 at 10 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225 (1984).
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international customary standards of liability as to what constitutes a
taking, and thus avoided a definitive ruling on its applicability. 90
Exclusive reliance on customary law generates other controversies,
however, particularly those relating to the often widely divergent asser-
tions of the parties as to the content of those principles. Consequently,
while the initial decisions tended to place full reliance on customary in-
ternational law and found that those principles encompassed the obligation
of full compensation, the Tribunal preferred to reach this same result
through the avenue of the Treaty of Amity in INA Corp. v. Iran.9 1 Article
IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity states that property of U.S. nationals "shall
not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without
the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be
in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of
the property taken." 92 The claimant in INA Corp. asserted that this Treaty
provision provided the legal standard governing the expropriation of its
interest in an insurance company nationalized pursuant to a formal law.
Because the respondent Government of Iran elected not to argue that the
Treaty was inapplicable, the Tribunal ruled that its provisions were bind-
ing and determinative. Consequently, it avoided placing any reliance on
customary international law in awarding full compensation for the taking.
Shortly thereafter the Tribunal issued another award confirming the
binding character of the Treaty of Amity in a case in which Iran had
challenged its validity. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran9 3 the Tribunal found
that the Treaty applied to a seizure of the claimant's property interest in
a company. The Tribunal held that the Treaty of Amity's provisions for
unilateral termination had never been invoked. 94 Similarly, the Tribunal
found that the Treaty had not been implicitly terminated as a result of
economic and military sanctions imposed by the United States against
Iran after the seizure of the hostages in Iran. The Tribunal sidestepped
discussion of any issues that might have affected the Treaty's present-
day validity, and, in particular, did not discuss whether "changed cir-
cumstances" would prohibit reliance on the Treaty today.95 The Tribunal
held that the Treaty was applicable to the case at hand. Since this seminal
award, the Tribunal has routinely held that the Treaty of Amity provides
the standard of compensation in expropriation cases. 96
90. Award No. ITL 55-129-3 at 34 (Oct. 28, 1985).
91. Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985).
92. See id. at 9; Treaty of Amity, supra note 81, 8 U.S.T. at 903.
93. Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986).
94. Id. at 15, 25 I.L.M. at 626.
95. Id. at 15-16, 25 I.L.M. at 626-27.
96. See Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 at 13-14 (Aug. 8, 1986); SEDCO, Inc. v. Iran,
Award No. 59-129-3 at 6-7 (Mar. 27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 629, 632 (1986).
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All awards applying the Treaty of Amity have concluded that the
Treaty's standard of "full equivalence" requires the expropriating Gov-
ernment to place the claimant in the same economic position it enjoyed
at the time of the expropriation. Even in INA Corp. v. Iran97-in which
all three judges issued elaborate separate opinions exploring their inter-
pretation of customary international law-the nondissenting arbitrators
agreed that the Treaty embodied the notion of full compensation, in which
"the measure of compensation ought to be such as to approximate as
closely as possible in monetary terms . . . the principle of restitutio in
integrum." 98 Consequently, in the case of an ongoing commercial enter-
prise, the Tribunal awarded, as the " 'full equivalent of the property
taken,' " an amount equal to "the fair market value of [the claimant's]
shares [in the expropriated company], assessed as of the date of the
nationalization." 99
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran10 0 the Tribunal ignored Iran's contention
that net book value as reduced by subsequent alleged losses conformed
to the definition of "full equivalent," and focused on the extent to which
goodwill plus long-term and short-term profits could confidently be val-
ued.' 01 Finally, in Payne v. Iran102 the Tribunal determined that if an
expropriated company was a going concern when taken, it "must value
the claimant's interests on the basis of the fair market value of his shares
taking into account the debts of the companies including tax liabilities." 103
The Tribunal has therefore consistently adopted the position that the
Treaty of Amity's requirement of full compensation entails the payment
of the genuine economic equivalent of the seized property, measured at
fair market value, and including future income in the case of an expro-
priated going concern.
Several of the Tribunal's more recent awards have explored the inter-
relationship between the standard of compensation set out in the Treaty
of Amity and that developed through customary international law. These
awards have concluded, without exception," °4 that the two sources impose
97. Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985).
98. See id. at I (Lagergren, J., separate opinion (Aug. 15, 1985)). The dissenting opinion
of Judge Ameli, id. at 53 (Nov. 26, 1986), did not share this view.
99. INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-16-1 at 10 (quoting the Treaty of Amity, supra
note 81, art. IV(2)).
100. Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986).
101. Id. at 17-18, 25 1.L.M. at 627-28.
102. Award No. 245-335-2 (Aug. 8, 1986).
103. Id. at 17-18.
104. The separate opinion of Judge Lagergren in INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-
1 (Aug. 15, 1985) theorizes as to the standard of compensation in a large-scale nationalization
of an entire industry, suggesting that a standard less than restitutio in integrum should be
adopted in certain circumstances. The accompanying separate opinion of Judge Holtzmann
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essentially identical obligations on the expropriating state. In Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Iran10 5 the Tribunal suggested that the Treaty of Amity stipulated
compensation standards "similar, if not identical" to those found under
customary international law, citing American International Group v. Iran, 106
and Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran.10 7 The Tri-
bunal has subsequently confirmed these holdings by citing and relying
upon the formulas for valuation of going concerns at fair market value
set out in INA Corp. 108 and American International Group. 109
The most extensive award to date discussing the compensation stan-
dards found in the Treaty of Amity and customary international law is
SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co. 110 In SEDCO the Tribunal was
required to determine the compensation standard applicable to the ex-
propriation of an oil drilling company when Iran argued that the Treaty
of Amity, even if applicable, incorporates the standard allegedly found in
customary international law. The Tribunal rejected arguments that United
Nations General Assembly resolutions and declarations,' 1 ' or other pur-
ported indications of state practice in the area, had eroded the traditional
standard of full compensation. The Tribunal reviewed opinions of inter-
national tribunals, legal publicists, and other relevant authorities, and
concluded that the standard of full compensation is overwhelmingly
supported. 112
The Tribunal's award in Oilfield of Texas, Inc. v. Iran appears to rein-
force, at least implicitly, the explicit conclusions of Phelps Dodge and
SEDCO. 113 Oilfield of Texas awarded the full value of expropriated oil
concludes that "[w]hile some commentators have put forth theories of less than full compen-
sation," the "fact is that courts and international tribunals when faced with the responsibility
of deciding actual cases overwhelmingly follow the rule of awarding full compensation for
governmental takings." Id. at 4 (Holtzmann, J., separate opinion). No award of the Tribunal
has yet adopted Judge Lagergren's proposed theory of compensation, while one award, Am.
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 21-22 (Dec. 19, 1983), rejected it. See also
SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-129-3 at 22 n.31 (Mar. 27, 1986)
(Brower, J., separate opinion), reprinted in 25 I.L.M: 636, 647 (1986).
105. Award No. 217-99-2 at 16 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 627 (1986).
106. Award No. 93-2-3 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96 (1983).
107. Award No. 141-7-2 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219 (1984).
108. INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985).
109. See Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 at 14-15 (Aug. 8, 1986).
110. Award No. ITL 59-129-3 (Mar. 27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 629 (1986).
Ill. The cited resolutions were G. A. Res. 3201, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); G. A. Res. 3281,29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975); G. A.
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5344 (1962), reprinted in 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1963). See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-
129-3, at 25 I.L.M. at 9 nn.ll-13, 25 I.L.M. at 633 nn.lI-13.
112. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-129-3 at 11-14, 25
I.L.M. at 634-35. See also id. at 10-22, 25 I.L.M. at 641-47 (Brower J., separate opinion).
113. Oilfield of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 258-43-1 (Oct. 8, 1986).
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production assets without finding it necessary to inquire into the inter-
relationship of the Treaty of Amity or customary international law. In-
stead, the Tribunal merely cited Phelps Dodge and SEDCO as the support
for its conclusion that, once an uncompensated expropriation is found to
have occurred, the full value of the expropriated assets must be awarded
to the claimant.1 14
A remaining question confronted in some cases is whether the standard
of compensation should vary depending upon the lawfulness or unlaw-
fulness of the taking. The Tribunal has ruled that an expropriation must
meet three criteria to be considered lawful: It must be (1) nondiscriminatory,
(2) for a public purpose, and (3) (implicitly) accompanied by compensa-
tion meeting the standard prescribed by applicable law. 115 In American
International Group v. Iran 16 the Tribunal applied this rule in holding
that the nationalization of an insurance company pursuant to an industry-
wide law of nationalization did not violate either of the first two elements
of the test although compensation had not been paid prior to the award.
Because the Tribunal held that the requisite standard of compensation
was the full, fair market value of the claimant's nationalized shares in the
enterprise,11 7 the Tribunal implicitly rejected the notion of a two-tiered
system of compensation, providing partial compensation in lawful expro-
priations and full compensation in unlawful ones. This holding was sub-
sequently confirmed in SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,118 in
which the Tribunal concluded, based upon an analysis of relevant inter-
national law authorities, that full compensation must be awarded "whether
or not the expropriation itself was otherwise lawful."' "19
To date, therefore, the Tribunal's awards have consistently reached the
conclusion that full compensation must be paid by an expropriating state.
That this conclusion has been reached via application of the Treaty of
Amity, and by reference to customary international law, in varying con-
texts including both isolated expropriations and large-scale nationaliza-
tions, underscores the strong support manifested today for the principle
of full compensation.
IV. Quantification of Damages
A crucial area of the Tribunal's awards, one which has perhaps remained
in the shadow of the debate over the standard of compensation, is the
114. Id. para. 43.
115. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 14-15 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 96, 105 (1983).
116. Id.
117. See id at 21-22, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 109.
118. Award No. ITL 59-129-3 (Mar. 27, 1986), 25 I.L.M. 629 (1986).
119. Id. at 11-13, 25 I.L.M. at 634-35.
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issue of how actually to calculate damages based on the designated com-
pensation standard.
A. ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE TAKING
It is generally recognized that valuation of the expropriated property
must exclude any diminution in value caused by the fact of expropriation.
The Tribunal has stated: "[N]either the effects of the very act of nation-
alization should be taken into account nor the effects of events that oc-
curred subsequent to the nationalization."' 120
However, Tribunal precedent has equally recognized that general eco-
nomic conditions must be considered, including the economic vicissitudes
of a revolutionary period, at least to the extent that such conditions are
not considered part of the expropriating interference attributable to the
Government. In American International Group, Inc. v. Iran the Tribunal
held:
[P]rior changes in the general political, social and economic conditions which
might have affected the enterprise's business prospects as of the date the en-
terprise was taken should be considered. Whether such changes are ephemeral
or long-term will determine their overall impact on the value of the enterprise's
future prospects. '21
These principles were also followed in Payne v. Iran 22 and Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Iran.123 Each of these cases held that the value of the corpora-
tions, which were expropriated after the culmination of the Revolution,
had to be reduced by the pessimistic business outlook then prevailing.
B. THE NATURE OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY
Close attention must also be paid to the precise nature of the expro-
priated property. Simple assets may be viewed as compensable on a
different basis from an integrated business entity. This concern lay behind
Judge Holtzmann's criticism of the needlessly muddled terms of reference
by which an accounting expert was appointed to value an expropriated
business investment in Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran.124
120. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 16-17 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 96, 106 (1983); see also INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 at 10 (Aug.
13, 1985).
121. Am. Int'l Group,Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 18 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 96, 107 (1983).
122. Award No. 245-335-2 at 16-18 (Aug. 8, 1986).
123. Award No. 217-99-2 at 17 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 627 (1986).
124. See Award No. ITL 32-24-1 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122 (1983) (Holtz-
mann, J., separate opinion).
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The particular sector of the economy involved may also be impor-
tant. 125 In two decisions of Chamber Two, the Tribunal paid special atten-
tion to the type of industry in which the expropriated entity was engaged and
the general prospects for economic stability of that entity. Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Iran1 26 considered the expected future prospects of an expro-
priated industrial facility designed for the production of wire and cable
products. Payne v. Iran, 127 however, viewed the expropriation of a service
sector entity as subject to greater future risk in a post-revolutionary en-
vironment, presumably since the demand for such services was more
subject to variations in governmental policy, especially when the Gov-
ernment itself was a primary customer. Thus, aspects of the economic
setting of the expropriated business cannot be ignored.
C. VALUATION METHODS
When the expropriated property interest is an ongoing commercial en-
terprise the Tribunal consistently has ruled that the standard of full com-
pensation requires granting the fair market value of the enterprise, taking
into account both the present value of reasonably ascertainable future
profits as well as any outstanding obligations. 128 Theories based solely
on historical cost, such as net book value, have never been adopted, since
they do not take into account future profits and thus exclude a primary
ingredient in any actual calculation of the genuine economic value of a
business enterprise or income-producing asset. 129
In some circumstances the claimant has requested merely the disso-
lution value of the enterprise, based on a liquidation of the individual
assets at their individual fair market value and discharge of any outstand-
ing liabilities. When so requested, the Tribunal has usually followed this
method. 130 This approach is consistent with the requirement of full com-
pensation under circumstances in which a prudent investor would liqui-
125. The Tribunal ruled early on that it is the value of the property in the hands of the
investor (i.e., as taken), not the value in the hands of the expropriating government, (i.e.,
as received), that is considered. See Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran,
Award No. 141-7-2 at 10 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225 (1984).
126. Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986).
127. Award No. 245-335-2 at 14, 18 (Aug. 8, 1986).
128. See id. at 17; INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 at 10 (Aug. 13, 1985).
129. See, e.g., Payne v. Iran, Award No. 245-335-2 at 16-17 (Aug. 8, 1986); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 16-17 (Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 619, 627
(1986).
130. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. ITL 59-129-3 at 4 n.2 (Mar.
27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 629, 631 n. 4 (1986); Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting
Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 at 12 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 226
(1984).
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date the enterprise in order to obtain the maximum benefit of an enterprise
rather than suffer continued losses.
Similarly, when a claimant seeks the replacement value of specific as-
sets, the Tribunal has found this basis for valuation may be consistent
with an award of the legally required full value. In Oil Field of Texas,
Inc. v. Iran the Tribunal awarded, as the full value, the "amount it would
have cost to replace the [specific assets seized], based upon the market
conditions for such equipment at the time." 131 Under the prevailing con-
ditions, in which demand for the equipment was high, delays in obtaining
new equipment were prolonged, and significant rental income could be
obtained through immediate possession and leasing of this equipment.
There, the Tribunal recognized that "whether the equipment at issue was
used or new is not as such determinative as to its value." ' 132 The result
reached by the Tribunal appears reasonable since it was directly tied to
the real value (the cost of securing functionally identical assets on the
open market, taking into account the genuine economic gains that could
have been expected to accrue through ownership of the assets).
The Tribunal awards do not yet permit a judgment as to which of the
many possible financial theories for valuation of ongoing businesses is
preferred. Methods based on price/earnings ratios, discounted cash flow
analysis, actual share prices, and other criteria have been suggested. 133
None has been rejected outright as implausible or inaccurate, but two
themes are evident: First, no theory will be accepted if it does not, in the
Tribunal's view, realistically account for all the relevant economic factors
affecting the income; second, the claimant is well-served by two or more
corroborating valuation models, since in the absence of a single accepted
method the Tribunal is more likely to approximate, rather than calculate,
its final determination of damages.
The decision in Payne v. Iran134 is a recent example. The claimant
sought the fair value of two electronics parts and servicing companies
expropriated after the climax of the Revolution, based on a multiple of
ten times the net average earnings for the three years preceding the taking.
The Tribunal concluded, however, that the claimant had underestimated
the adverse effects on the business prospects caused by the Revolution
and the disruption in Iran-U.S. trade relationships. Since much of the
preexisting business was Government-related, and the business was also
dependent on spare parts and components that could no longer be ex-
131. Award No. 258-43-1, paras. 43, 44 (Oct. 8, 1986).
132. See id. para. 44.
133. See, e.g., Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 at 56 (Dec. 19, 1983),
4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122, 157 (1983) (authorizing expert to use discounted cash flow method).
134. Award No. 245-335-2 (Aug. 8, 1986).
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ported from the United States, the Tribunal held that past performance
was not a reliable "indicator of likely future profitability." 135 The Tribunal
was bolstered in its view by the claimant's preexpropriation attempts to
transfer much of the business elsewhere. 136 After rejecting the financial
theory proposed by the claimant, it adopted its own course. It undertook
"an approximation of the value of the claimant's interest in the two com-
panies, taking into account all the circumstances of the Case." This was
the entire explanation for the resulting figure, which was approximately
one-third of the claim. 137
This result is fairly typical of the Tribunal's awards to date. In American
International Group, Inc. v. Iran the Tribunal rejected a similar proposed
valuation on grounds that the expert appraisals provided by the claimants:
(1) did not sufficiently consider changes in economic and social conditions
relevant to sales up through the events of 1979; (2) did not account for
all applicable taxes; and (3) were based on less than five business years,
deemed to be an insufficient period for projecting future income given the
periodic industry-wide fluctuations. 138 After rejecting the proposed net
book value generally as not including elements of valuation such as likely
future profitability and goodwill, and specifically as being based upon
questionable accounting instructions,1 39 the Tribunal opted for an un-
elaborated estimation, "an approximation of that value, taking into ac-
count all relevant circumstances .... ,,140
It seems clear that the more quantitative data and corroborative val-
uation models are given, the better the Tribunal is able to calculate a just
figure based upon its own conclusions about the relevant business
prospects.
V. Conclusion
Fairly consistent patterns on issues involving expropriation have emerged
at the Tribunal.
135. Id. at 18.
136. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 17-18, reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 619, 627-28 (1986) (noting that the claimant had elected not to participate in increased
joint capital contributions, and thus basing its valuation on claimant's actual conduct re-
flecting doubts about the economic viability of the entity being valued).
137. Id.
138. Award No. 93-2-3 at 19 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 107-08 (1983).
139. Id. at 20-21, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 108-09.
140. Id. at 22, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 109; see also Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting
Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 at 14-16 (June 29, 1984), 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 228
(1984); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 at 17-18 (Mar. 18, 1986), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 619, 627-28 (1986); Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3 at 23 (Dec.
20, 1983), 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 212, 224 (1983).
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A taking will be found to occur whenever actions attributable to the
Government amount to an unreasonable interference with the owner's
use or control of the property. The reasonableness of the interference is
generally determined pragmatically, focusing on the owner's rights to
management and income. A finding of attributability generally requires
at least one deliberate governmental assertion of control over the cor-
poration, such as the substitution of Government-appointed managers.
Losses caused by revolutionary unrest not directly traceable to such a
governmental action have not generally been held to constitute com-
pensable expropriations.
The Tribunal has explored the requisite standard of compensation. Re-
gardless of the applicable law-the Treaty of Amity or customary inter-
national law-the Tribunal has held that full compensation, measured as
fair market value including reasonably predictable future profits in the
case of ongoing ventures, must be paid.
Issues relating to quantification of damages are more unsettled. Most
theoretically sound measures of valuation may be acceptable if they take
adequate account of the general economic conditions. Only those actions
of the Government associated with the specific expropriation are excluded
in the valuation process. Loss of business prospects due to revolutionary
turmoil, or changes in governmental policies not forming the basis of the
expropriation, must be considered in determining quantification.
In the coming years, as the Tribunal completes arbitration of its many
pending and active expropriation cases, it can be expected that these
broad legal conclusions will be further articulated, emphasized, and elab-
orated as the same issues are confronted in new factual situations.
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